Insuring post-retirement benefits to retirees is a joint responsibility of the employees, employers, and the US government. Managers have been shown to manipulate pension plan reports with the intention of maximizing their own gains to the detriment of current and future retirees. External monitoring by regulators and auditors is effective in curbing this opportunistic behavior. This paper extends these findings to examine if effective internal monitoring in the form of strong corporate governance is instrumental in controlling manipulations of pension reports by managers. Empirical tests support the finding that effective corporate governance is inversely associated with the extent of managerial manipulations in pension plan reporting. This result should be of interest to employees, retirees, and the US Government that are trying to insure the future income of senior citizens.
Introduction
This paper examines if good corporate governance leads to higher quality corporate pension reporting in the US. Given the changing population profile in this country, research that deals with pension benefits is critical. According to recent projections by the US government, the population of people 65 years or older is expected to more than double by 2050, mainly due to the Baby Boom cohort that retires between 2011 and 2029 and the increase in human longevity. Thus, planning for the welfare of the aged population is one of the major priorities for the government. This concern was also reflected during the recent Presidential election campaign.
The United States currently has one of the most extensively evolved and complex pension systems that incorporates three major elements: (1) Public Social Security system under the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program; (2) Private pension system offered by employers; and (3) Individual retirement savings (Asthana 2009 ). US Government tries to encourage private pension plans that supplement public Social Security through tax relief and other incentives. Private pension benefits provide a critical component to the post-retirement income of today"s Americans, especially with the current problems facing the Social Security system. These problems are expected to multiply with the mass retirement of the Baby Boom cohort, cost-ofliving inflation, and medical advances resulting in longer retirement years. The financial problems of the public insurance system would lead to retirees depending more and more on their employer managed pension plans. 1 Managers are known to behave opportunistically with the intent to maximize their own gains. Given the complexity of pension accounting in the US and the difficulty in detecting any manipulations of the underlying actuarial estimates, managers would be tempted to manipulate pension fund reporting. On the other hand, effective corporate governance should lead to better management, more adherences to rules, and better safeguards for the rights of retirees and employees. Thus, good corporate governance would be a deterrent for managers to behave opportunistically. As a result, better corporate governance is expected to lead to higher quality pension accounting/reporting. This paper uses univariate and multivariate tests to show that corporate governance is inversely related to opportunistic behavior of managers in the area of pension accounting. In other words, managers of firms with strong corporate governance are less likely to use actuarial assumptions to manipulate pension plan reports in the US.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the theory and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design and section 4 outlines the sample selection procedure. Section 5 discusses the results and the final section presents the conclusions. 
Theory and Hypothesis

Research on Managerial Opportunism
Research Design
The discount rate assumed by the defined-benefit pension plan is regarded by researchers as a barometer of the quality of pension accounting/reporting for several reasons. Fich and Shivdesani (2006) report that firms with busy boards, those in which a majority of outside directors hold three or more directorships, exhibit weak governance. They have lower market-to-book ratios and weaker profitability. BOARDBUSY, thus, represents weaker internal monitoring and would lead to more opportunistic behavior by managers. This variable is predicted to have a positive sign. More independent boards (BOARDINDEP) will monitor managers more stringently and so the variable is expected to have a negative sign. Boards that meet frequently have been shown to be more effective (Yang and Krishnan 2005). Thus, BOARDMTGS is predicted to have a negative sign. Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) show that large boards (proxied by BOARDSIZE) are more unwieldy and less effective. BOARDSIZE will therefore have a positive sign. Raghunandan and Rama (2003) and Dechow et al. (1996) show that firms with CEO duality tend to have poorer management. As a result, CEODUALITY is expected to have a positive sign. Director absenteeism (proxied by DIRABSENT) will also adversely affect the quality of corporate governance and encourage managerial opportunism. DIRABSENT should have a positive sign.
The rest of the variables, DAR, FUNDINGRATIO, NONAUDITFEE, REGULATED, ROA, SIZE, TAXRATE, are control variables based on prior research (Asthana 1999) . Firms with higher DAR will be closer to debtcovenant violations (Press and Weintrop 1990) and are likely to indulge in more manipulations of pension plans to reduce visibility (positive coefficient). Similarly firms with low FUNDINGRATIO will have more incentives to manipulate pension liabilities to increase the ratio and avoid visibility costs (Asthana 1999 ). Thus, FUNDINGRATIO should have an inverse relationship (negative sign) with DEVIATION. Firms in regulated industries and with better quality (more independent) auditors will have more intensive external monitoring (Asthana 2001) . As a result, REGULATED will be negatively associated and NONAUDITFEE will be positively associated with DEVIATION. More profitable firms have fewer incentives to manipulate earnings through pension expense minimization. Thus ROA should have a negative coefficient. Larger firms will be more visible and will therefore be at greater risk of being detected and will exhibit less managerial opportunism. SIZE will, therefore, have a negative sign. Finally, firms with higher TAXRATE have greater incentives to maximize their tax benefits by over funding their pension funds (Asthana 1999) . They can achieve this by over-reporting their pension liabilities. This leads to a predicted positive coefficient on TAXRATE. Debt to assets ratio FUNDINGRATIO = Ratio of the pension plan assets deflated by the projected benefit obligations NONAUDITFEE = Measure of lack of auditor independence; equal to the ratio of non-audit fees to the total auditor"s fees. REGULATED = Equals 1 if the firm belongs to a regulated industry; 0 otherwise ROA = Return on assets SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets of the firm in $ million TAXRATE = Effective tax rate; equals federal taxes payable deflated by income before taxes Results (not reported) do not change qualitatively when outliers are removed. Thus, the results appear to be robust with regards to heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity, and outliers.
Sample
Results
Conclusion
There is ample evidence in extant research that managers make discretionary accounting choices opportunistically. There is mixed evidence that firms with effective corporate governance are more likely to curb such behavior. This paper applies these findings to the area of pension accounting where managers have been shown to manipulate actuarial assumptions when reporting pension numbers. With the growing population of retirees in the US, along with the pending mass retirement of the Baby Boomers, the management of pension funds is an extremely critical issue that will affect the future income of all current and future retirees. The findings in this paper show that effective internal monitoring in the form of strong corporate governance is able to act as a watchdog and curtail opportunistic behavior of managers in the area of pension plan management. These findings should be of interest to employers, employees, regulatory agencies, and researchers. To the extent that US pension plans are similar to those in other countries, the findings should be applicable to such countries as well. See table 1 for variable definitions. *** implies two-sided significance at 1% and ** implies two-sided significance at 5%.
